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Abstract—The MDS property (aka the k-out-of-n property)
requires that if a file is split into several symbols and subsequently
encoded into n coded symbols, each being stored in one storage
node of a distributed storage system (DSS), then an user can
recover the file by accessing any k nodes. We study the so-called
p-decodable µ-secure erasure coding scheme (1 ≤ p ≤ k−µ, 0 ≤
µ < k, p|(k − µ)), which satisfies the MDS property and the
following additional properties:
(P1) strongly secure up to a threshold: an adversary which
eavesdrops at most µ storage nodes gains no information
(in Shannon’s sense) about the stored file,
(P2) partially decodable: a legitimate user can recover a subset
of p file symbols by accessing some µ+ p storage nodes.
The scheme is perfectly p-decodable µ-secure if it satisfies the
following additional property:
(P3) weakly secure up to a threshold: an adversary which
eavesdrops more than µ but less than µ+ p storage nodes
cannot reconstruct any part of the file.
Most of the related work in the literature only focused on the case
p = k − µ. In other words, no partial decodability is provided:
an user cannot retrieve any part of the file by accessing less than
k nodes. For our more general code, Property (P2) guarantees
partial decodability: once the user accesses p more nodes than
the strong security threshold µ, it can start to decode some subset
of p file symbols.
We provide an explicit construction of p-decodable µ-secure
coding schemes over small fields for all µ and p. That construction
also produces perfectly p-decodable µ-secure schemes over small
fields when p = 1 (for every µ), and when µ = 0, 1 (for every
p). We establish that perfect schemes exist over sufficiently large
fields for almost all µ and p.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data replication is the most common way for distributed
storage systems (DSS) to guarantee high data availability and
node failure tolerance. Most of the current distributed storage
systems are using 3-way replication where each piece of data is
replicated three times and each of its copy is stored at a differ-
ent storage node in the system. If at most two storage nodes are
down, the data is still available at at least one node. However,
3-way replication is highly inefficient in storage overhead, as
only a very modest portion 33% of the whole storage capacity
can be used. As the demand for data storage scales up quickly,
replication based storage systems incur significantly high cost
in terms of storage footprint and power usage for cooling
systems. It is well known that erasure codes [1] possess lots
of advantages over replication [2]. Giants such as Microsoft,
Facebook, and Google have, therefore, included erasure codes,
alongside replication, in their distributed storage systems [3],
[4], [5].
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Fig. 1: Illustration for perfectly p-decodable µ-secure era-
sure coding scheme. Partial decoding starts when the first
µ + p nodes are accessed. At this point, the first subset
of p file symbols (s1, . . . , sp) is reconstructed. When the
first µ + 2p nodes are accessed, the next subset of p file
symbols (sp+1, . . . , s2p) can also be decoded. In fact, if the
user requests only (sp+1, . . . , s2p), it is sufficient to access
the first µ nodes and the nodes numbered from µ + p + 1
to µ + 2p. The general requirement for partial decoding is:
(srp+1, . . . , s(r+1)p) can be reconstructed by accessing the
first µ nodes and p additional nodes numbered from µ+rp+1
to µ+ (r + 1)p. We always assume that p|(k − µ).
In this work we investigate a construction of erasure coding
schemes for DSS that are secure in terms of data confidential-
ity: even when some of its storage nodes are compromised or
eavesdropped by some unwanted party, the stored file is still
kept confidential. Moreover, such secure codes must provide
easy partial decoding for a legitimate user, which can often
access more nodes than an illegal adversary. We proposed
the so-called p-decodable µ-secure erasure coding scheme
(1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, 0 ≤ µ < k), which satisfies the MDS
property (the file can be reconstructed by accessing any k out
of n storage nodes) and the following additional properties:
(P1) strongly secure up to a threshold: an adversary which
eavesdrops at most µ storage nodes gain no information
(in Shannon’s sense) about the stored file,
(P2) partially decodable: a legitimate user can recover a subset
of p file symbols by accessing some µ+p storage nodes.
Regarding (P2), throughout this paper we always assume that
p|(k − µ). In other words, we can always partition the set
of k − µ file symbols into subsets of size p each. Apart from
(P1)-(P2), if the following additional property is also satisfied,
the scheme is referred to as perfectly p-decodable µ-secure:
(P3) weakly secure up to a threshold: an adversary which
eavesdrops more than µ but less than µ+p storage nodes
cannot reconstruct any part of the file,
We illustrate the properties of a perfect coding scheme in Fig 1.
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Code rate Strong security threshold Weak security threshold Partial decodability threshold
Systematic erasure code k/n 0 0 1
Codes for (erasure) wiretap channel II [6], [7] (k − µ)/n µ N.A. N.A.
Ramp secret sharing scheme [8], [9], [10] (k − µ)/n µ k − 1 k
p-decodable µ-secure code (k − µ)/n µ N.A. µ+ p
Perfectly p-decodable µ-secure code (k − µ)/n µ µ+ p− 1 µ+ p
TABLE I: Comparison among five erasure coding schemes. Strong (weak) security threshold refers to the maximum number
of storage nodes that the adversary is allowed to access without jeopardizing the strong (weak) security of the scheme. Partial
decodability threshold refers to the number of nodes an user has to access to start decoding the file partially. Here 0 ≤ µ ≤ k−1,
1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, and p|(k − µ). When p = 1 and µ = 0, the (perfectly) p-decodable µ-secure scheme is actually systematic.
An ‘N.A.’ entry means that the corresponding threshold can take any value and that threshold is not even considered in the
design of the coding scheme.
Note that when p = k−µ, only (strong and weak) security
is guaranteed and there is no partial decodability: an user
cannot retrieve any part of the file by accessing less than
k nodes. Such a secure coding scheme was first studied in
the work of Yamamoto [8] in the context of ramp secret
sharing scheme. Recently, superregular matrices (all square
submatrices are invertible) such as Cauchy matrices have also
been employed to construct such codes [9], [10]. Similar work
in secure regenerating codes, which can be regarded as vector
erasure codes with optimal node repair, can be found in [11],
[12].
In this work we address the gap in the literature regarding
partial decodability of erasure coding schemes. In our pro-
posed coding scheme, while Property (P1) and Property (P3)
provide (strong and weak) security, Property (P2) guarantees
partial decodability: once the user accesses p more nodes than
the strong security threshold µ, it can start to decode some
subset of p file symbols. A secure erasure code that supports
partial decoding is particularly useful in applications involving
retrieval of large files. A typical example is in video streaming
services, where a large-size video is often split into chunks
and these chunks are then streamed one by one to the user.
Our proposed coding scheme, if employed in such services,
would provide not only confidentiality but also ease of partial
retrieving of the video to any desired level. We stress that
extending the existing secure coding schemes by taking into
account partial decodability does not result in any overhead.
Small field Large field
p-decodable µ-secure ∗∀µ, ∀p N.A.
perfectly p-decodable µ-secure
p = k − µ [8], [9], [10]
∗∀µ, ∀p∗p = 1, ∀µ
∗µ = 0, 1, ∀p
TABLE II: A summary of existence of (perfectly) p-decodable
µ-secure coding schemes. The entries with an asterisk ‘∗’ are
the new results established in this work. A field is “small” if
its size is a polynomial in n and k, or “large” if otherwise.
Our main contribution is summarized below.
• We provide an explicit construction over small fields for
p-decodable µ-secure coding schemes for any p and µ.
• We provide an explicit construction over small fields for
perfectly p-decodable µ-secure coding schemes when p =
1 (for every µ), and when µ = 0, 1 (for every p, p|k−µ).
• We prove that perfectly p-decodable µ-secure schemes
exist over sufficiently large fields for almost all p and µ.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides neces-
sary notation and definitions. The construction of p-decodable
µ-secure schemes is presented in Section III. We discuss the
existence of perfect coding schemes in Section IV. The paper
is concluded in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Let Fq denote the finite field with q elements. Let [n] denote
the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a vector u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Fnq , let
uT denote the transpose of u. For any n ≥ 1 let In denote
the identity matrix of order n. We also use O to denote the
all-zero matrix of certain size.
Below we define standard notation from coding theory (see
[1]). The (Hamming) weight of u is wt(u) = |{i : ui 6= 0}|.
The (Hamming) distance between two vectors u and v is
d(u,v) = wt(u− v). An [n, k, d]q (error-correcting) code C
(sometimes d and q are dropped) is a subspace of the vector
space Fnq of dimension k such that the minimum distance
between any two distinct vectors in that subspace is at least d.
We called d = d(C ) the minimum distance of the code. The
well-known Singleton bound states that for any [n, k, d]q code,
d ≤ n− k+1. A code attaining the Singleton bound is called
maximum distance separable (MDS). Any vector in a code is
referred to as a codeword. A generator matrix of an [n, k]q
code is a k × n matrix whose rows are linearly independent
codewords of the code.
B. Coset Coding Technique
Let r = (r1, . . . , rµ) be a vector of independent and
identically uniformly distributed random variables over Fq .
Let S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sk−µ), where Si’s (i ∈ [k − µ])
are independent and identically uniformly distributed random
variables over some alphabet Fq . We assume that the file to
be stored in the system is s = (s1, s2, . . . , sk−µ) ∈ Fk−µq , a
realization of S. We call k−µ the file size and each si a file
symbol.
We denote by D(n, k) a DSS with n storage nodes where
the file can be recovered from the contents of any k out of n
nodes. Node i (i ∈ [n]) stores a coded symbol ci, which is
a function of the file symbols si’s and the random symbols
rj’s. Let c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn). Let C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) be
c’s corresponding vector of random variables over Fq . We only
consider here scalar linear erasure coding schemes, based on
[n, k]q MDS codes, described as follows. The file s ∈ Fk−µq
is encoded to c = xG ∈ Fnq , where
• x = (s | r) is obtained by concatenating s and r,
• G is a generator matrix of an [n, k, n − k + 1]q MDS
code. We often refer to G as the coding matrix.
It is well known in coding theory [1] that if Node i stores ci
produced as above then the file can be recovered by accessing
any k nodes. For the coding scheme to be strongly secure
against an adversary that can access µ nodes (see Definition 1),
the last µ rows ofGmust generate an [n, µ] MDS code. In fact,
this is an equivalent way to describe the coset coding technique
invented by Ozarow and Wyner [6]. This technique has been
widely adopted in the network coding literature to secure a
network code against a wiretapper (see, for instance [13] and
references therein).
C. Security and Partial Decodability
We assume that an adversary can eavesdrop/access any
m storage nodes of its choice and tries to learn illegally
the content of the stored file. We refer to m as the ad-
versary’s strength. In the following definitions, recall that
S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sk−µ) represents the file stored in the
system.
Definition 1. An erasure coding scheme for a DSS D(n, k)
is called strongly secure against an adversary of strength m
(m < k) if the entropy
H
(
S | {Ci : i ∈ E}
)
= H
(
S
)
,
for all subsets E ⊆ [n], |E| ≤ m. We also refer to such a
coding scheme as strongly m-secure.
In words, a coding scheme is strongly µ-secure if an
adversary which can access an arbitrary set of at most µ
storage nodes cannot obtain any information at all about the
stored file. It is well-known that as long as the bottom µ× n
submatrix of G also generates an [n, µ] MDS code then the
coding scheme described in Section II-B is strongly µ-secure.
The MDS code generated by such a matrix G is often called
a nested MDS code in the literature.
Definition 2. An erasure coding scheme for a DSS D(n, k)
is called weakly secure against an adversary of strength m
(m < k) if the entropy
H
(
Sj | {Ci : i ∈ E}
)
= H
(
Sj
)
,
for all j ∈ [k − µ] and for all subsets E ⊆ [n], |E| ≤ m. We
also refer to such a coding scheme as weakly m-secure.
The following lemma specifies a necessary and sufficient
condition for the weak security of the erasure coding scheme
described in Section II-B.
Lemma 3. Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sk−µ) ∈ Fk−µq be the stored
file and r = (r1, r2, . . . , rµ) be some random vector over Fq .
Let (s | r)M , where M is a k×m matrix over Fq , represent
the m coded symbols stored at some m storage nodes that the
adversary has access to. Then the adversary cannot determine
any particular file symbol si if and only if the column space
of M does not contain ei for every i ∈ [k − µ], where ei
is the unit vector with only one nonzero coordinate at the ith
position.
Proof: Appendix A.
The intuition behind the proof of this lemma is explained
below. As the adversary obtains (s | r)M , it can linearly
transform these coded symbols by considering the product
(s | r)MαT, where α ∈ Fmq is some coefficient vector. The
adversary can determine a file symbol si (i ∈ [k − µ]) if and
only if there exists α so that MαT = ei. As MαT is a vector
of CM , we derive the conclusion in Lemma 3.
After Yamamoto [8], the concept of weak security was
also discovered by Bhattad and Narayanan [14] in a more
general context of network coding. Weak security is important
in practice since it guarantees that no meaningful information
is leaked to the adversary, and often requires no additional
overhead. For instance, suppose that the file s = (s1, s2, s3)
is to be stored in a DSS with four storage nodes, which
tolerates one node failure. Using an usual systematic erasure
code, the four nodes store c = (s1, s2, s3, s1 + s2 + s3).
However, if an adversary can access any node among the
first three, then it can retrieve some si, which is part of
the file. On the other hand, if the file is encoded into
c = (s1+s2, s1+s3, s2+s3, s1+s2+s3), then an adversary
who accesses one storage node would not be able to determine
any si. Indeed, for instance if it observes s1 + s2, then it
cannot determine the exact value of either s1 or s2, as for the
adversary, both s1 and s2 are completely random variables.
If s is a video and si’s are movie chunks, then by using the
latter coding scheme, an adversary who observes one storage
node cannot determine each chunk, and hence, cannot play
any part of the movie. Such coding scheme is said to be
weakly secure against an adversary of strength one, or weakly
1-secure. Moreover, that coding scheme consists of the same
number of storage nodes and can also tolerate one node failure,
hence introduces no storage overhead compared to a normal
systematic code. In fact, while strong security always comes
with a cost in storage capacity, weak security is often given
for free.
Definition 4. We consider the coding scheme described in
Section II-B, where G is a generator matrix of an [n, k, n −
k + 1]q MDS code and the file s ∈ Fk−µq is encoded into the
coded vector c = (s | r)G ∈ Fnq . Suppose that 0 ≤ µ < k,
1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, and moreover p|(k − µ). The coding scheme
based onG is p-decodable µ-secure if it satisfies the following
properties simultaneously.
(P1) It is strongly µ-secure as defined in Definition 1.
(P2) It is p-decodable: each subset of p file symbols
{srp+1, srp+2, . . . , s(r+1)p} (0 ≤ r ≤ (k − µ)/p − 1)
can be reconstructed from the content of some µ + p
storage nodes.
The coding scheme is perfectly p-decodable µ-secure if it
satisfies the following additional property:
(P3) It is weakly (µ+p−1)-secure as defined in Definition 2.
We also say that the corresponding coding matrix G is
(perfectly) p-decodable µ-secure.
Remark 5.
• A (perfectly) 1-decodable 0-secure code is simply a
systematic code in the classical sense, where each file
symbol is stored as is (in its clear form) at some node.
• A perfectly (k − µ)-decodable µ-secure code is the type
of secure codes studied in the work of Yamamoto [9] and
Olivera et al. [10].
• We can replace the weak security in (P3) by the block se-
curity (equivalently, security against guessing) [14], [11]
which requires a stronger condition that no information
about any subset of file symbols up to a certain size
is known to the adversary. In fact, all of our results in
this work can be extended to block security. However,
to simplify the presentation, we restrict ourselves to only
weak security.
We illustrate the concept of perfectly p-decodable µ-secure
coding scheme in the following example.
Example 6. Let k = 5, n = 6, µ = 1, p = 2, and q = 11. Let
s = (s1, s2, s3, s4) ∈ F411 be the stored file and r a random
symbol over F11. We use the following coding matrix
G =

0 1 6 0 0 7
0 6 4 0 0 0
0 0 0 2 10 7
0 0 0 7 1 1
4 5 10 1 9 6.

The coding scheme is
c = (s | r)G.
We show below that this coding scheme is perfectly 2-
decodable 1-secure. Firstly, it is easy to verify thatG generates
a [6, 5]11 MDS code. Therefore, the file can be reconstructed
by accessing any five storage nodes. The bottom 1× 6 matrix
also obviously generates a [6, 1] MDS code, hence guarantees
that the scheme is strongly 1-secure. Hence (P1) is satisfied.
To verify (P3), note that µ+ p− 1 = 1 + 2− 1 = 2. We can
easily verify that any two columns of G do not generate an
unit vector ei for every i ∈ [4]. Hence, according to Lemma 3,
the coding scheme is weakly 2-secure. Lastly, for (P2), we
prove that each of the 2-subsets {s1, s2} and {s3, s4} can be
reconstructed by accessing some three nodes (µ + p = 3).
Indeed, by accessing the first three nodes, an user obtains the
product
(s1, s2, s3, s4, r)

0 1 6
0 6 4
0 0 0
0 0 0
4 5 10.

If we post-multiply the above product with the vector α =
(10, 4, 5)T then we obtain s1. If we post-multiply the above
product with the vector β = (5, 5, 1)T then we obtain s2.
Hence, {s1, s2} can be reconstructed by accessing the first
three nodes. Similarly, we can verify that {s3, s4} can be
reconstructed by accessing Node 1, Node 4, and Node 5.
III. A CONSTRUCTION OF p-DECODABLE µ-SECURE
CODING SCHEMES
We establish in this section a general construction for p-
decodable µ-secure erasure coding schemes, which satisfy (P1)
and (P2): an adversary which can access the content of µ
storage nodes gains no information about stored file, and a
legitimate user can retrieve each subset of p file symbols by
accessing some µ+ p storage nodes.
A. A General Construction
We start with the definition of superregular matrices, which
is critical in our construction.
Definition 7 ([15]). A superregular matrix is a matrix where
every square submatrix is invertible.
Two well-known constructions of superregular matrices
are via Cauchy matrices and Vandermonde matrices [16]. A
Cauchy matrix is a matrix of the form C =
(
1/(xi − yj)
)
i,j
where xi’s and yj’s are distinct elements of any finite field
Fq . Cauchy matrices are superregular by themselves. The
following straightforward results about superregular matrices
are especially useful in our construction.
Lemma 8. Let C be a superregular k × n matrix (k ≤ n).
Then the following hold.
• Any submatrix of C is also superregular.
• Any subset of k′ rows of C (1 ≤ k′ ≤ k) generates
an [n, k′] MDS code. Hence, every nontrivial vector
generated by these k′ rows has weight at least n−k′+1.
• Any subset of n′ columns of C (1 ≤ n′ ≤ k), generates
a [k, n′] MDS code. Hence, every nontrivial vector gen-
erated by these n′ columns has weight at least k−n′+1.
We now describe our general construction, using the
so-called partial superregular matrices.
Main Construction.
• Step 1. Choose any superregular k × n matrix G′′ and
write it in the following block form.
G′′ =
( µ
A′′
k−µ
B′′
n−k
C ′′
D E F
)
k−µ
µ
(1)
• Step 2. Perform elementary row operations to turn the
matrix A′′ at the top-left corner into an all-zero matrix.
We can do so by adding certain linear combination of
the last µ rows of G′′ to each of its first k − µ rows.
Note that the µ × µ matrix D is invertible, hence its
rows can generate any vector of length µ. The resulting
matrix, referred to as G′, can be presented in block form
as below. Since there is no row operation performed on
the last µ rows, the three block submatrices D, E, F
are the same in G′′ and G′.
G′ =
( µ
O′
k−µ
B′
n−k
C ′
D E F
)
k−µ
µ
(2)
• Step 3. Perform elementary row operations on the first
k − µ rows of G′ to turn the square submatrix B′ into
a new square matrix B of the same size determined as
follows. It is a block diagonal matrix where each block
submatrix is of size p×p. Moreover, except from the zero
entries, all other entries, which belong to those block p×p
submatrices, are the same as the corresponding entries in
B′′. Equivalently, B can be obtained from B′′ by turning
those entries that do not belong to any block diagonal
submatrix into zero. We can write B in the block form
as below, where B′′i (1 ≤ i ≤ (k − µ)/p) is the ith
diagonal block p× p submatrix of B′′.
B =
p p · · · p

B′′1 p
B′′2 p
. . .
...
B′′k−µ
p
p
(3)
Such transformation can always be done because both
B′′ and B are invertible. Thus, the coding matrix G, as
the output of Step 3, is determined by
G = TG′,
where the transform matrix T is
T =
( k−µ
BB′−1
µ
O′
O Iµ
)
k−µ
µ
We can write G in block format as follows.
O
D
C
FE
k − µ
µ
O
O
µ p p p· · ·
p
p
p
...G =
n− k
. . .
B′′1
B′′2
B′′k−µ
p
where C = BB′−1C ′.
Note that the coding matrix G produced by the Main
Construction has the same entries as the original superregular
matrix G′′, except for those zero entries and entries in block
submatrix C. Therefore, we often refer to G constructed in
this way as partial superregular matrix. We illustrate the steps
to construct a partial superregular matrix in Example 9.
Example 9. Let k = 5, n = 6, q = 11, µ = 1, and p = 2.
Step 1. Let us choose G′′ to be a Cauchy matrix
G′′ =

2 1 6 3 7 9
8 6 4 9 5 2
7 4 3 2 10 8
10 9 2 7 1 5
4 5 10 1 9 6
 .
Step 2. As the bottom-left entry is nonzero, we can add certain
multiple of the last row to each of the first four rows of G′′
to obtain
G′ =

0 4 1 8 8 6
0 7 6 7 9 1
0 9 2 3 8 3
0 2 10 10 6 1
4 5 10 1 9 6
 .
Step 3. Finally, we can perform certain elementary row
operations on the first four rows to obtain the coding matrix
G =

0 1 6 0 0 7
0 6 4 0 0 0
0 0 0 2 10 7
0 0 0 7 1 1
4 5 10 1 9 6.
 ,
which is proved earlier in Example 6 to generate a (perfectly)
2-decodable 1-secure coding scheme.
The following lemmas assert that a coding scheme based on
a partial superregular matrix, which is produced by the Main
Construction, is indeed p-decodable µ-secure.
Lemma 10. The partial superregular matrix G produced
by the Main Construction generates an [n, k] MDS code.
Moreover, the last µ rows of G also generates an [n, µ] MDS
code. As a consequence, the coding scheme based on G has
the MDS property and moreover, satisfies (P1) (i.e., being
strongly µ-secure).
Proof: As G′′ generates an [n, k] MDS code and G is
obtained from G′′ by applying only elementary row operation,
G generates the same [n, k] MDS code. Since the last µ rows
of G are the same as those of G′′, they also generates an
[n, µ] MDS code. Hence (P1) is satisfied.
Lemma 11. An erasure coding scheme based on a partial
superreregular matrix G (Main Construction) always satisfies
(P2): each subset of p file symbols {srp+1, srp+2, . . . , s(r+1)p}
(0 ≤ r ≤ (k−µ)/p−1) can be reconstructed from the content
of some µ+ p storage nodes.
Proof: Recall that the file s is encoded into c = (s |
r)G. We prove that the first p file symbols {s1, s2, . . . , sp}
can be reconstructed from the first µ + p coordinates
of c. In general, it can be proved in a similar manner
that for each r where 0 ≤ r ≤ (k − µ)/p − 1, the
p file symbols {srp+1, srp+2, . . . , s(r+1)p} can be recon-
structed from µ+ p coordinates of c, namely c1, . . . , cµ, and
cµ+rp+1, . . . , cµ+(r+1)p.
The coding matrix G produced by the Main Construction
can be presented in the block form as follows.
G =

O
B′′1
C
B′′2
. . .
B′′(k−1)/p
D E1 E2 · · · E(k−1)/p F
 ,
where each Ei is a µ × p submatrix of E such that E =(
E1 | E2 | · · · | E(k−1)/p
)
. According to the structure of G,
the first µ+ p coordinates of c can be written as
(c1 · · · cµ+p) = (s1 · · · sp | r1 · · · rµ)H1,
where
H1 =
( µ
O′
p
B′′1
D E1
)
p
µ
.
Since G′′ is superregular, both B′′1 and D are invertible. Let
v ∈ Fpq be the ith column in the inverse of B′′1 (1 ≤ i ≤ p).
Moreover, let u ∈ Fµq be the column vector satisfying Du =
−E1v. Then
H1
(
u
v
)
=
(
B′′1v
Du+E1v
)
=
(
ei
0
)
,
where
ei = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
p−i
)T.
Therefore, the user can reconstruct si as follows.
si = (s1 · · · sp | r1 · · · rµ)
(
ei
0
)
= (s1 · · · sp | r1 · · · rµ)H1
(
u
v
)
= (c1 · · · cµ+p)
(
u
v
)
.
As i can be chosen arbitrarily between 1 and p, we conclude
that an user which has access to the first µ+ p coordinates of
c can reconstruct all si for 1 ≤ i ≤ p. The proof follows.
Theorem 12. The Main Construction produces a coding
matrix that generates a p-decodable µ-secure coding scheme
for all 0 ≤ µ < k and 1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, p|(k − µ).
Proof: According to Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, the Main
Construction produces a coding matrix that generates a coding
scheme satisfying both (P1) and (P2). Hence, such scheme is
p-decodable µ-secure, according to Definition 4.
IV. ON PERFECTLY p-DECODABLE µ-SECURE CODING
SCHEMES
In this section, we first prove that a coding matrix produced
by the Main Construction in Section III-A also satisfies
(P3) when p = 1 (∀µ) and when µ = 0, 1 (∀p). Finally,
we establish the existence of perfectly p-decodable µ-secure
coding schemes over sufficiently large fields for almost every
p and µ (namely, k ≥ 2(µ+ p)− 1).
A. The Case p = 1
A (perfectly) 1-decodable µ-secure coding scheme is the
best scheme among all strongly µ-secure schemes in terms of
partial decoding. Such a scheme allows the user to reconstruct
one file symbol right after the user accesses one more node
than the security threshold µ. It is a sharp turn from knowing
nothing about the file to being able to reconstruct one file
symbol. In fact, according to Lemma 11, after accessing the
first µ nodes, accessing any additional node would give the
user one new file symbol. Hence, beyond the threshold µ, the
coding scheme works in a similar manner as the conventional
systematic coding scheme. Note that when p = 1 and µ = 0,
a (perfectly) 1-decodable 0-secure coding scheme is nothing
other than a normal systematic coding scheme.
Lemma 13. When p = 1, the Main Construction produces
a matrix G that generates a (perfectly) 1-decodable µ-secure
coding scheme for any µ ≥ 0.
Proof: When p = 1, (P3) is satisfied trivially. Hence,
the Main Construction yields a coding scheme satisfying
simultaneously (P1), (P2), and (P3). Such a coding scheme,
according to Definition 4, is perfectly 1-decodable µ-secure.
B. The Case µ = 0
A perfectly p-decodable 0-secure coding scheme is of
particular interest because of the following properties.
• Weak security with no overhead on storage capacity:
the scheme provides weak security against an adversary
which can access up to p − 1 storage nodes. Such an
adversary cannot reconstruct any part of the stored file.
Moreover, no storage overhead occurs compared to a
normal erasure coding scheme: the file size is k and the
code is an [n, k] MDS code. That is because there are no
random symbols employed in the scheme.
• p-partial decodability: the user can reconstruct each
subset of p file symbols by accessing certain p storage
nodes.
Lemma 14. When µ = 0, the Main Construction produces
a matrix G that generates a perfectly p-decodable 0-secure
coding scheme for any p ≥ 1, p|k.
Proof: Due to Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, it suffices
to prove that the coding matrix G produced by the Main
Construction generates a coding scheme satisfying (P3) - weak
security. According to Lemma 3, we aim to show that any set
of p − 1 (= µ + p − 1) columns of G does not generate an
unit vector of weight one. As p|k, we consider the following
two cases: k = p and k ≥ 2p.
If k = p, as µ = 0, the coding matrix G is simply the same
as the input superregular matrix G′′. By Lemma 8, any set of
p−1 columns of G generates a [p, p−1, 2] MDS code, hence
never generates an unit vector ei, which has weight less than
two. Therefore, according to Lemma 3, the coding scheme
based on G is weakly secure against an adversary which can
access at most p− 1 nodes. Hence (P3) is satisfied.
We now assume that k ≥ 2p. When µ = 0, the matrix G
has the following form.
G =

B′′1
C
B′′2
. . .
B′′k/p
 .
We assume, by contradiction, that some set L of p−1 columns
of G generates an unit vector ei ∈ Fkq . Without loss of
generality, we can assume that i = 1. For simplicity, we
slightly abuse the notation and also use L to denote the set of
indices of the columns in L. Then there exist some coefficients
αj ∈ Fq (j ∈ L), so that
∑
j∈L
αjG[j] = e1 =

1
0
...
0
 , (4)
where G[j] denotes the jth column of G. Note that the p× p
block matrixB′′1 is a square submatrix of a superregular matrix
G′′, and hence is invertible. Therefore, there exists a linear
combination of the first p columns of G that generate the
vector −e1. In other words, there exist some coefficients βj ∈
Fq (j ∈ [p]), such that
p∑
j=1
βjG[j] = −e1 =

-1
0
...
0
 . (5)
By (4) and (5), we deduce that
p∑
j=1
βjG[j] +
∑
j∈L
αjG[j] = 0. (6)
Hence, there exists a linear combination of these at most (2p−
1) columns of G that is equal to 0. Note that we assume
k ≥ 2p. Moreover, according to Lemma 10, G is an [n, k]
MDS code. Hence, any set of at most k columns of G must
be linear independent. We obtain below a contradiction by
arguing that the linear combination of at most 2p − 1 < k
columns in (6) is nontrivial, that is, their coefficients are not
identically zero. Then the proof would follow.
First, according to Lemma 8, as B′′1 is superregular, any
p− 1 columns of B′′1 form a [p, p− 1, 2] MDS code. In other
words, any p− 1 columns of B′′1 does not generate a nonzero
vector of weight less than two. Combining this fact with (5),
we deduce that βj 6= 0 for all j ∈ [p]. Therefore, in the linear
combination (6), while the first sum consists of p columns of
G with all nonzero coefficients, the second sum is a linear
combination of p− 1 columns of G. Hence, there must be at
least one term in the first sum that cannot be canceled out.
Thus, (6) is a nontrivial linear combination of less than k
columns of G. This conclusion contradicts the fact that any k
or less columns of G must be linearly independent.
C. The Case µ = 1
Lemma 15. When µ = 1, the Main Construction produces
a matrix G that generates a perfectly p-decodable 1-secure
coding scheme for any p ≥ 1, p|(k − 1).
Proof: Due to Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, it suffices
to prove that the coding matrix G produced by the Main
Construction generates a coding scheme satisfying (P3) - weak
security. According to Lemma 3, we aim to show that any
set of p (= µ + p − 1) columns of G does not generate an
unit vector of weight one. As p|(k − 1), there are two cases:
k − 1 = p and k − 1 ≥ 2p.
In the case k − 1 = p, there is no partial decodability and
we simply use the superregular matrix G′′ in Step 1 of the
Main Construction, instead of G. By Lemma 8, any set of
p = k − 1 columns of G′′ generates a [p, p − 1, 2] MDS
code, hence cannot generate an unit vector ei of weight one.
Therefore, the coding scheme based on G′′ is weakly secure
against an adversary which can access at most p − 1 storage
nodes. Hence (P3) is satisfied.
Now we assume that k − 1 ≥ 2p. When µ = 1, the matrix
G has the following form.
G =

0
B′′1
C
B′′2
. . .
B′′(k−1)/p
d1,1 E1 E2 · · · E(k−1)/p F
 ,
where 0 is a (k − 1)× 1 all-zero column vector, D = (d1,1)
is a 1 × 1 matrix, and Ei is a 1 × p row vector for each
1 ≤ i ≤ (k−1)/p. Note that E = (E1 | E2 | · · · | E(k−1)/p).
We now assume, by contradiction, that some set L of p
columns of G generates an unit vector ei ∈ Fkq , for some
i ∈ [k − 1]. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
i = 1. For simplicity, we slightly abuse the notation and also
use L to denote the set of indices of the columns in L. Then
there exist some coefficients αj ∈ Fq (j ∈ L), so that
∑
j∈L
αjG[j] =

1
0
...
0
0
...
0

, (7)
where G[j] denotes the jth column of G.
Let J = {2, 3, . . . , p+1}. We first argue that L 6= J . Indeed,
the matrix (
B′′1
E1
)
(8)
is a submatrix of the superregular matrix G′′ chosen in Step 1
of the Main Construction. Therefore, according to Lemma 8,
its columns generate a [p + 1, p, 2] MDS code. Hence, every
nontrivial linear combination of these p columns has weight at
least two. As a consequence, any nontrivial linear combination
of p columnsG[j]’s (j ∈ J), which correspond to the columns
of the matrix in (8), has weight at least two. However, due to
(7), the columns in L can generate the unit vector e1, which
has weight one. Thus, L and J must be different.
As G′′ is superregular, B′′1 is invertible. Therefore, there
exist some coefficients βj ∈ Fq (j ∈ J), such that
∑
j∈J
βjG[j] =

−1
0
...
0
E1β
T
 , (9)
where β = (β2, . . . , βp+1). According to Lemma 8, any
set of less than p columns of B′′1 would never generate a
nontrivial vector of weight less than two. Therefore, from (9),
we deduce that βj 6= 0 for every j ∈ J . Moreover, since G′′ is
superregular, d1,1 must be nonzero. Hence, there exists some
γ ∈ Fq such that γd1,1 = −E1βT. Therefore,
γG[1] =

0
0
...
0
−E1βT
 , (10)
From (7), (9), and (10) we have∑
j∈L
αjG[j] +
∑
j∈J
βjG[j] + γG[1] = 0. (11)
Note that the left-hand side of (11) is a linear combination of
at most 2p + 1 (≤ k) columns of G. We argue earlier that
βj 6= 0 for every j ∈ J and that L 6= J . Let j0 ∈ J \ L.
Then, the coefficient of G[j0] in the linear combination of
(11) is βj0 6= 0. Hence this linear combination is nontrivial.
Therefore, we obtain a contradiction, since G generates an
[n, k] MDS code and at the same time, has some set of at
most k columns that are linearly dependent.
We summarize the results established so far on perfectly
p-decodable µ-secure codes in the following theorem.
Theorem 16. The Main Construction produces a coding
matrix that generates a perfectly p-decodable µ-secure coding
scheme when p = 1 for every µ ≥ 0, µ < k, and when µ = 0, 1
for every p ≥ 1, p|(k − µ).
D. Existence of Perfect Coding Schemes Over Large Fields
For general p and µ, the Main Construction may not
produce a perfectly p-decodable µ-secure coding matrix. In
order to achieve a perfect code, there is another property
that the superregular matrix G′′ (used in Step 1 of the Main
Construction) must satisfy. We first define this property in
Definition 17 and then proceed to prove that there always
exists a superregular matrix satisfying this property as long
as the field size is sufficiently large.
Definition 17. A k × n matrix G′′ (k ≤ n) is said to be
(p, µ)-superregular if it is superregular and also satisfies the
following additional property. Let G′′ be written in the block
form
G′′ =
( µ
A′′
k−µ
B′′
n−k
C ′′
D E F
)
k−µ
µ
. (12)
Let B′′i be the ith p×p submatrix lying on the main diagonal
of B′′. Note that the entries outside these p×p block matrices
are nonzeros.
B′′ =

B′′1
B′′2
. . .
B′′k−µ
p
 .
Let Ei be the ith µ× p submatrix of E such that E = (E1 |
E2 | · · · | E k−µ
p
). For each i ∈ [(k − µ)/p] we consider the
block matrix Hi given below.
Hi =
( µ
O′
p
B′′i
D Ei
)
p
µ
. (13)
Then it is required that for every i ∈ [(k − µ)/p], deleting
simultaneously an arbitrary row among the first p rows of Hi
and an arbitrary column among the first µ columns of Hi
always results in an invertible (µ + p − 1) × (µ + p − 1)
matrix.
Let ΞG′′ = (ξi,j) be a k × n matrix where ξi,j’s are
indeterminates over some Fq . The subscript G′′ simply means
that at a certain time, we will replace the entries ξi,j’s of ΞG′′
by appropriate elements of Fq to obtain a matrix G′′ over Fq ,
which is to be used in the Main Construction. We represent
ΞG′′ as a block matrix as follows.
ΞG′′ =
( µ
ΞA′′
k−µ
ΞB′′
n−k
ΞC′′
ΞD ΞE ΞF
)
k−µ
µ
. (14)
Let fsuper(. . . , ξi,j , . . .) ∈ Fq[. . . , ξi,j , . . .] be the product of
the determinants of all square submatrices of ΞG′′ .
Let ΞB′′i be the ith p × p submatrix lying on the main
diagonal of ΞB′′ .
ΞB′′ =

ΞB′′1
ΞB′′2
. . .
ΞB′′
(k−µ)/p
 . (15)
Let ΞE be the ith µ × p submatrix of ΞE such that ΞE =
(ΞE1 | ΞE2 | · · · | ΞE(k−µ)/p). For each i ∈ [(k − µ)/p] we
consider the block matrix ΞHi given below.
ΞHi =
( µ
O′
p
ΞB′′i
ΞD ΞEi
)
p
µ
. (16)
Let fi(. . . , ξi,j , . . .) ∈ Fq[. . . , ξi,j , . . .] be the product of
determinants of all square (µ+p−1)×(µ+p−1) submatrices
of ΞHi obtained by deleting simulatenously one arbitrary row
among the first p rows and one arbitrary column among the
first µ columns. Let f(µ,p) =
∏ k−µ
p
i=1 fi ∈ Fq[. . . , ξi,j , . . .].
Lemma 18. The polynomials fsuper and f(µ,p) defined as
above both are not identically zero.
Proof: In this proof we use the standard definition of
determinant to calculate a determinant of a matrix. More
specifically, if P = (pi,j) is any square matrix of order r
then the determinant
det(P ) =
∑
σ∈Sr
sgn(σ)
r∏
i=1
pi,σ(i), (17)
where Sr denotes the symmetric (permutation) group on r
elements, and sgn(σ) denotes the sign of the permutation σ.
We first prove that fsuper is not identically zero. It suffices to
show that the determinant of each square submatrix of ΞG′′ is
not identically zero. According to (17), such a determinant is
a sum of (µ+ p− 1)! monomials (with appropriate signs ±1)
of ξi,j’s. Those monomials are obviously pairwise distinct.
Therefore, their sum is not identically zero.
We now show that f(µ,p) is not identically zero. It suffices
to show that for each i ∈ [(k−µ)/p], deleting simulateneously
a row among the first p rows and a column among the first
µ columns of ΞHi (given in (16)) results in a matrix with
not identically zero determinant. For convenience, let us refer
to such a matrix as P . Then P is a square matrix of order
(µ + p − 1). All entries of P are indeterminates ξi,j , except
for those lying in the (p− 1)× (µ− 1) top-left submatrix.
P =
( µ−1
O
p
(ξi,j)
(ξi,j) (ξi,j)
)
p−1
µ
. (18)
Therefore, all entries on the antidiagonal (the diagonal goes
from the lower-left corner to the upper-right corner of the
matrix) are nonzero. These µ + p − 1 antidiagonal entries
form an unique nonzero monomial of ξi,j’s in the formula
for determinant of P in (17), which cannot be canceled out
by any other monomial. Hence, det(P ) is not identically zero
as a polynomial.
Lemma 19. For every 0 ≤ µ < k and 1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ,
p|(k − µ), there always exists a (p, µ)-superregular k × n
matrix G′′ over any sufficiently large field.
Proof: According to Lemma 18, the polynomial
fsuperf(µ,p) ∈ Fq[. . . , ξi,j , . . .] is not identically zero. By [17,
Lemma 4], for sufficiently large q, there exist g′′i,j ∈ Fq such
that fsuper(. . . , g′′i,j , . . .) 6= 0 and f(µ,p)(. . . , g′′i,j , . . .) 6= 0. The
former condition guarantees that the k×n matrix G′′ = (g′′i,j)
is a superregular matrix, while the latter further implies that
G′′ is (p, µ)-superregular, according to Definition 17. Thus, a
(p, µ)-superregular k × n matrix G′′ always exists over any
sufficiently large field.
Lemma 20. Suppose that the matrix G′′ used in Step 1 of the
Main Construction is (p, µ)-superregular and that G is the
resulting coding matrix.
G =

O
B′′1
C
B′′2
. . .
B′′(k−1)/p
D E1 E2 · · · E(k−1)/p F
 , (19)
where each Ei is a µ×p submatrix of E such that E =
(
E1 |
E2 | · · · | E(k−1)/p
)
. For each i ∈ [(k − µ)/p] let
Hi =
( µ
O′
p
B′′i
D Ei
)
p
µ
. (20)
Then any set of µ + p − 1 columns of Hi that consists of
the last p columns and some µ− 1 columns among the first µ
columns generates a [µ+p, µ+p−1, 2] MDS code. Thus, such
a set of µ+p−1 columns of Hi, as well as the corresponding
set of µ + p − 1 columns of G, never generates a nontrivial
vector of weight less than two.
Proof: Note that since G′′ is (p, µ)-superregular, deleting
simultaneously an arbitrary row among the first p rows and an
arbitrary column among the first µ columns of Hi always
results in an invertible matrix of order µ+ p− 1.
Let K be the submatrix of Hi obtained by deleting some
column among the first µ columns of Hi. In order to show
that the columns of K generate an MDS code, it suffices to
prove that every square submatrix Q of order µ + p − 1 of
K is invertible. Indeed, if Q is obtained by deleting one row
among the first p rows of K, then it is obviously invertible,
due to the property of Hi specified earlier. Suppose that Q
is obtained by deleting one row among the last µ rows of
K. Then det(Q) is equal to the product of det(B′′i ) and the
determinant of a square submatrix of order µ−1 ofD. As both
B′′i and D are superregular, we conclude that the determinant
of Q must be nonzero. Therefore, Q is invertible.
Theorem 21. For every 0 ≤ µ < k and 1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ,
p|(k−µ), such that k ≥ 2(µ+p)−1, there exists a perfectly p-
decodable µ-secure coding scheme over any sufficiently large
field Fq .
Proof: In Step 1 of the Main Construction let us choose
G′′ to be a (p, µ)-superregular matrix over a sufficiently large
field Fq . Let G be the coding matrix produced by the Main
Construction. We present G in the block form as shown in the
Main Construction.
G =

O
B′′1
C
B′′2
. . .
B′′(k−1)/p
D E1 E2 · · · E(k−1)/p F
 . (21)
Note that each Ei is a µ× p submatrix of E such that E =(
E1 | E2 | · · · | E(k−1)/p
)
.
According to Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, G satisfies (P1)
and (P2). It remains to show that G satisfies (P3) - weak
security.
According to Lemma 3, we aim to show that no subsets
of (µ + p − 1) columns of G generate the unit vector ei for
every i ∈ [k − µ]. Without loss of generality, we can assume,
by contradiction, that a subset L of some (µ+p−1) columns
of G generates the unit vector e1. For simplicity, we slightly
abuse the notation and also use L to denote the set of indices of
the columns in L. Then there exist some coefficients αj ∈ Fq
(j ∈ L) such that
∑
j∈L
αjG[j] =

1
0
...
0
0
...
0

, (22)
where G[j] is the jth column of G. For convenience, we
assign αj = 0 for all j ∈ [n] \ L. Let J = {µ + 1, µ +
2, . . . , µ+ p}.
As B′′1 is invertible, there exist some coefficients βj ∈ Fq
such that
∑
j∈J
βjG[j] =

−1
0
...
0
E1β
T
 , (23)
where β = (βµ+1, . . . , βµ+p). According to Lemma 8, any
set of less than p columns of B′′1 would never generate a
nontrivial vector of weight less than two. Therefore, from (23),
we deduce that βj 6= 0 for every j ∈ J . Moreover, as D is
invertible, there exist some coefficients γj ∈ Fq such that∑
j∈[µ]
γjD[j] = −E1βT,
where D[j] is the jth column of D. Therefore,
∑
j∈[µ]
γjG[j] =

0
0
...
0
−E1βT
 . (24)
From (22), (23), and (24) we have∑
j∈L
αjG[j] +
∑
j∈J
βjG[j] +
∑
j∈[µ]
γjG[j] = 0. (25)
Note that the left-hand side of (25) is a linear combination of
at most 2(µ + p) − 1 (≤ k) columns of G. We consider the
following three cases and aim to obtain contradictions in all
cases.
Case 1. ∃j0 ∈ J : αj0 = 0.
We argue earlier that βj 6= 0 for every j ∈ J . Moreover,
in this case, there exists j0 ∈ J such that αj0 = 0. Hence,
the linear combination in (25) must be nontrivial, since at
least one vector, namely G[j0], has a nonzero coefficient βj0 .
Therefore, we obtain a contradiction, since G generates an
[n, k] MDS code and at the same time, has some set of at
most k columns that are linearly dependent.
Case 2. ∀j ∈ J : αj 6= 0 and L \ J ⊆ [µ].
Note that in this case, L consists of p columns indexed by
J and some µ − 1 of the first µ columns of G. According
to Lemma 20, L does not generate any nontrivial vector of
weight less than two. This conclusion contradicts (22).
Case 3. ∀j ∈ J : αj 6= 0 and L \ J 6⊆ [µ].
In this case, L consists of p columns indexed by J , at most
µ−1 of the first µ columns of G, and probably some columns
indexed by elements in the set [n] \ ([µ] ∪ J). If αj = 0 for
all j ∈ L \ ([µ] ∪ J), then similar to Case 2, we obtain a
contradiction due to Lemma 20 and (22).
If there exists j ∈ L \ ([µ]∪ J) such that αj 6= 0, then (25)
presents a nontrivial linear combination of at most k columns
of G, which is a zero vector. This assertion contradicts the
fact that as G generates an [n, k] MDS code, any set of k
columns of G must be linearly independent.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose in this work a method to construct erasure
coding schemes which are not only (strongly and weakly)
secure but also partially decodable. The partial decodablity
feature is extremely important in applications such as media
streaming, where it is usually not necessarily for the user
to download the whole file before he or she can start the
playback.
The type of erasure coding scheme developed in our work
offer the flexibility between security and partial decodability.
The system designer can adjust the security parameter and
the partial decodability parameter accordingly to obtain any
possible mixture of security and exposure of the stored data.
We emphasize that we can construct an erasure code which is
both secure and partially decodable without adding any extra
storage overhead compared to a merely secure erasure code
studied in the literature.
REFERENCES
[1] F. J. MacWilliams and N. J. A. Sloane, The Theory of Error-Correcting
Codes. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977.
[2] H. Weatherspoon and J. Kubiatowicz, “Erasure coding vs. replication: A
quantitative comparison,” in Revised Papers from the First International
Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, ser. IPTPS ’01, 2002, pp. 328–338.
[3] C. Huang, H. Simitci, Y. Xu, A. Ogus, B. Calder, P. Gopalan, J. Li,
and S. Yekhanin, “Erasure coding in windows azure storage,” in Proc.
USENIX Conf. Annual Technical Conference (ATC), 2012, pp. 2–2.
[4] A. Thusoo, Z. Shao, S. Anthony, D. Borthakur, N. Jain, J. S. Sarma,
R. Murthy, and H. Liu, “Data warehousing and analytics infrastructure
at Facebook,” in Proc. ACM SIGMOD Int. Conf. on Management of
Data (SIGMOD), 2010, pp. 1013–1020.
[5] D. Ford, F. Labelle, F. I. Popovici, M. Stokely, V.-A. Truong, L. Barroso,
C. Grimes, and S. Quinlan, “Availability in golobally distributed storage
systems,” in Proc. USENIX Conf. Operating Syst. Design Implementa-
tion, 2010, pp. 1013–1020.
[6] L. H. Ozarow and A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel II,” Bell Syst.
Tech. J., vol. 63, pp. 2135–2157, 1984.
[7] A. Subramanian and S. W. McLaughlin, “MDS codes on the
erasure-erasure wiretap channel,” 2009. [Online]. Available: http:
//arxiv.org/abs/0902.3286
[8] H. Yamamoto, “Secret sharing system using (k, L, n) threshold scheme,”
Electronics and Communications in Japan (Part I: Communications),
vol. 69, no. 9, pp. 46–54, 1986.
[9] M. Iwamoto and H. Yamamoto, “Strongly secure ramp secret sharing
schemes for general access structures,” Inf. Process. Lett., vol. 97, no. 2,
pp. 52–57, 2006.
[10] P. F. Oliveira, L. Lima, T. T. V. Vinhoza, J. Barros, and M. Me´dard,
“Coding for trusted storage in untrusted networks,” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Forensics Security, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 1890–1899, 2012.
[11] S. H. Dau, W. Song, and C. Yuen, “On block security of regenerating
codes at the MBR point for distributed storage systems,” in Proc. Int.
IEEE Symp. Inform. Theory (ISIT), 2014, pp. 1967–1971.
[12] S. Kadhe and A. Sprintson, “Weakly secure regenerating codes for
distributed storage,” in Int. Symp. Network Coding (NetCod), 2014, pp.
1–6.
[13] N. Cai and T. H. Chan, “Theory of secure network coding,” Proceedings
of the IEEE, vol. 99, no. 3, pp. 421–437, 2011.
[14] K. Bhattad and K. R. Narayanan, “Weakly secure network coding,”
in Proc. 1st Workshop on Network Coding, Theory, and Application
(NetCod), 2005.
[15] R. M. Roth and A. Lempel, “On MDS codes via Cauchy matrices,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 1314–1319, 1989.
[16] J. Lacan and J. Fimes, “Systematic MDS erasure codes based on
Vandermonde matrices,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 8, no. 9, pp. 570–
572, 2004.
[17] T. Ho, M. Me´dard, R. Koetter, D. R. Karger, M. Effros, J. Shi, and
B. Leong, “A random linear network coding approach to multicast,”
IEEE. Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 52, no. 10, 4413–4430.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
The only if direction is obvious, according to the discussion
below Lemma 3. It remains to prove the if direction.
Let s˜ and r˜ be the guessed value (by the adversary) for
the real file s and for the random vector r, respectively. By
accessing m storage nodes, the adversary obtains some linear
combinations of the file symbols si’s and the random symbols
rj’s, namely a = (s | r)M . We aim to show that for every
i ∈ [k − µ], all possible values for si are equally probable.
Choose an arbitrary i ∈ [k − µ] and an arbitrary element
v˜ ∈ Fq . It suffices to show that the system of linear equations{
(s˜ | r˜)M = a
(s˜ | r˜)eTi = v˜
(26)
always has the same number of solutions (s˜ | r˜) for every
choice of v˜ ∈ Fq . Here ei denotes the unit vector with a one
at the ith coordinate and zeroes elsewhere. It is a basic fact
from linear algebra that the solution set for the system (26)
above, if nonempty, is an affine space, which is the sum of one
solution of (26) and the solution space of the corresponding
homogeneous system. Therefore, if the system (26) always
has at least one solution for every v˜, then it would have the
same number of solutions for every v˜. Therefore, it remains to
prove that this system always has a solution for every choice
of v˜ ∈ Fq .
Note that we have{
(s | r)M = a
(s | r)eTi = si
. (27)
By subtracting the corresponding equations in the two systems
(26) and (27) and let x = (s˜−s | r˜−r) be the new unknowns,
we obtain the following system{
xM = 0
xeTi = v˜ − si
(28)
It is clear that the system (26) has a solution if and only if the
system (28) has a solution. Hence, it suffices to show that the
system (28) always has a solution for every choice of v˜ ∈ Fq .
We claim that there exists some x ∈ Fkq satisfying xM = 0
and xeTi 6= 0. Then it is obvious that
x∗ =
v˜ − si
xeTi
x
would be a solution of (28), and hence the proof follows.
Indeed, if xeTi = 0 for every x satisfying xM = 0 then e
T
i
must belong the the orthogonal complement of the solution
space of the system xM = 0, which is precisely the column
space of M . However, according to our assumption, the
column space of M does not contain ei. Thus, there must
exists some x ∈ Fkq satisfying xM = 0 and xeTi 6= 0, as
claimed above.
